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
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (1 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-T674248 5 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONS REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

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20 November 1967

Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67
(RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WAY6TO) (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

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SECTION I

Significant Activities

1. INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967 during which the Blackhorse Regiment completed its first year in the Republic of South Vietnam. During this quarter the regiment continued to conduct operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations within the Blackhorse Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) and Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) (see maps, Incl 9 and 10). Road clearing operations were continued on all major routes within the TAOI. The road clearing opened lines of communication, allowed the Vietnamese freer use of the roads of Long Khanh Province, and decreased the opportunity for Viet Cong Forces to halt traffic for tax collection. In addition, these clearing operations interdicted a major Viet Cong supply route from the May Tao Secret Zone to the Hat Dich Secret Zone.

The regiment remained attached to the 9th Infantry Division. The 2nd Squadron, which supported the AMERICAL Division in the I Corps Tactical Zone during August and September, returned to regimental control on 23 Oct 67, having departed Chu Lai by LST on 14 Oct 67.

Regimental Headquarters remained at Blackhorse Base Camp throughout the quarter.

II Field Force Vietnam LQI (7-66), subject: Campaign Plan of 1967, provided the planning guidance for regimental operations in the TAOI. It directed the Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry to conduct search and destroy operations within Long Khanh

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Province, to coordinate with the CG, 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) to secure highways within the province and to hinder Viet Cong tax collection along these highways. It further directed that the 11th Cavalry be prepared to assist US Bases at Long Binh, Bien Hoa and Vung Tao on order.

The Civic Action and Revolutionary Development program and Combined Operations with the 18th Division (ARVN) continued to play a key role in the regiment's counterinsurgency efforts.

The 11th Cavalry conducted seven squadron size or larger operations this quarter. During the Vietnamese National Elections the regiment conducted search and destroy operations and provided reaction forces throughout Long Khanh Province as requested by the province Chief. In addition, operations were conducted with the 18th Division (ARVN) to preclude harassment of civilians enroute to polling places. As a result of these efforts, 84.7% of the eligible Vietnamese voted on 3 September, while 78% voted on 22 October.

Units of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were continuously engaged in combat operations (92 days) against the Viet Cong. Operations varied from troop to squadron size during the quarter.

On 2 Aug 67, General Harold K. Johnson visited the Blackhorse Regiment, accompanied by Sergeant Major of the Army Wooldridge. Colonel Farley briefed the Chief of Staff on the regiment's operations since his previous visit on 24 December 1966. Following the briefing, General Johnson presented decorations and addressed the assembled troopers who represented the 1st, 3rd, and Provisional Squadrons. He pointed out that initially there had been doubts concerning the ability of armor to function in Vietnam, but that the fine record of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had eliminated these doubts.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The structure of the 11th Cavalry remained essentially the same throughout the reporting period (see Organizational Structure, Incl 1). The 2nd Squadron, which had been attached to the AMERICAL Division, departed Chu Lai, in the I Corps Tactical Zone, by IST for New Port (XS8793) on 14 Oct 67. The squadron, absent since 22 April, closed Blackhorse Base Camp on 23 Oct 67.

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Other changes were made to increase the combat effectiveness of the regiment. The 9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance) was attached to the regiment on 24 September by HQ, US Army Vietnam GO 4457 dated 21 Sep 67. The 46th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, was attached as of 25 Sep 67 under HQ, US Army Vietnam GO 5302, dated 17 Oct 67.

On 1 Sep 67 the Class B Finance Office of the 91st Finance was established at Blackhorse Base Camp by HQ, Saigon Support Command SO 244, dated 25 Aug 67.

A study made during August and September, 1967, determined that the combat power of this organization was reduced by two troop size units and three mortar squads daily for base camp defense requirements. One company or troop had to be on a 10 minute alert as a rapid reaction force, while another one-hundred and fifty line personnel were required nightly for ambush patrols and three mortar squads were required for close-in fire support. The command and control of the camp defense required one squadron headquarters operations center. In view of critical personnel shortages and operational missions, this was an unacceptable drain on the combat capabilities of this unit.

A new defense system was initiated on 4 Oct 67 to alleviate this problem. The concept of the new system is:

- a. Remove all combat essential personnel from the perimeter and replace them with combat support and combat service support personnel.
- b. Task organize and assign perimeter responsibilities on a proportionate basis.
- c. Organize the perimeter into three sectors with a task force command and control section for each sector.
- d. Organize one central control section that operates with, but separate from, the regimental S-3 Section.
- e. Undertake a comprehensive training program to train support personnel for ambush patrol duties.

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f. Relieve the squadrons of the ambush patrol responsibility when sufficient level of training of support personnel had been reached.

As a result of this new system, only one platoon size combat unit and three mortar squads are currently committed for base camp defense. The requirement for the rapid reaction force still exists, but only one platoon remains on 10 minute alert while the remainder of the company/troop is on a thirty minute alert during the hours of darkness only. This company/troop, less one platoon, is available during hours of daylight for combat operations. On 1 Nov 67 the support units assumed full ambush patrol responsibilities.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) The major enemy element opposing the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the TAOR/TAOI was the 5th Viet Cong Light Infantry Division with its principal subordinate elements, the 274th Viet Cong Regiment and the 275th Viet Cong Regiment. The 5th Division Headquarters was located primarily in the May Tao Secret Zone, except for a brief move north of Gia Ray in September. The 5th Division then returned to its customary location. (see sketch, Order of Battle, Incl 7)

(2) In August the 274th Viet Cong Regiment crossed Interprovincial Route 2 and moved into the Hat Dich with the intention of disrupting the GVN National Elections in early September. Operations against the 274th Viet Cong Regiment dealt severe logistical losses to the enemy; however, he displayed no intention of departing the Hat Dich.

(3) The 275th Viet Cong Regiment, established primarily in War Zone "D", refitted and retrained following heavy losses suffered in the 21 July 67 ambush of the 3rd Squadron along Interprovincial Route 20. The 275th Viet Cong Regiment moved to Phouc Long Province briefly in September and then returned to War Zone "D". They later moved back to Phouc Long and are located there at the close of the reporting period. The 1st Battalion, 275th Viet Cong Regiment is believed to be the security element for the 5th Viet Cong Division Headquarters.

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(4) The D800 Provincial Battalion operated in and out of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's TAOI. Most of its activities, however, centered in War Zone "D" and then west into Bien Hoa Province and Binh Duong Province.

(5) The 186th Main Force Battalion operated in the northern portion of Binh Tuy Province which became part of the 11th Cavalry's TAOI during this quarter.

(6) The D445 Local Force Battalion continued to operate in the Slope 30 area between the 5th Viet Cong Division Headquarters and the 274th Viet Cong Regiment. This unit functioned mainly in company-sized elements.

(7) One new unit was tentatively identified, the D440 Battalion, presumably located northwest of Gia Ray. This unit, coupled with the D445 Battalion and possibly another unit yet to be identified, are believed to be the forces that will comprise the Viet Cong Ba Bien Provincial Regiment. Intelligence has indicated the formation of such a regiment for some time, and the arrival of the D440 Battalion may signal the initial steps in such a reorganization.

(8) The 84th Rear Service Group continued to be located near the Slope 30 area in the same general vicinity as the D445 Battalion, providing logistical support to Viet Cong units.

(9) Local guerrilla units continued to operate against friendly forces and were responsible for numerous mining and sniping incidents.

(10) General locations of enemy units: (see sketch, Incl 7).

b. Major Engagements:

(1) The Viet Cong avoided the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and other friendly forces and conducted no major engagements during the quarter. Possibly the severe losses sustained by the 275th Viet Cong Regiment in late July and their subsequent return to War Zone "D" precluded action with this unit. Continuing pressure on the 274th Viet Cong Regiment in the Hat Dich Secret Zone

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dictated that the enemy avoid friendly forces or face a major defeat.

(2) Three lesser contacts provided the only significant activity. An engagement in September involving Troop K, 3rd Squadron, resulted in 8 Viet Cong KIA and the destruction of a supply point. This engagement possibly postponed an ambush along National Highway 1 by the 274th Viet Cong Regiment, although they were not positively identified in the Troop K engagement. The other two contacts involved the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Long Range reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP). There were 2 Viet Cong KIA in the Slope 30 area in August, and 4 Viet Cong KIA along the Dong Nai River in October. Documents and weapons captured in these engagements provided no significant new information on Viet Cong locations and activities.

(3) Other events were mostly mining and sniping incidents, probably initiated by Viet Cong infrastructure personnel. There were a series of mining incidents in early August and September 5 kilometers north of the base camp on Interprovincial Route 2. The enemy still suffered personnel losses, however, as friendly operations in Viet Cong base areas frequently revealed graves of recent casualties. The 3rd Squadron located 15 graves in a Viet Cong Base Camp in the Hat Dich which contained personnel who had apparently been killed by artillery and air strikes.

(4) The months of September and October have traditionally been periods of rest, training and planning for the Viet Cong 5th Division, which might explain the lull in activity this quarter. Two other considerations, however, could explain this inactivity of the major Viet Cong units in the TAOL. One is that operations against the 274th Viet Cong Regiment effectively contained it in the Hat Dich and forced the enemy to evade in place, leaving little time for rest, training or operations. The other consideration concerns a report, although unconfirmed, that the commander of the 275th Viet Cong Regiment was killed in action on the 21 July ambush. If this is true the enemy suffered a severe leadership loss, thus curtailing offensive operations from War Zone "D".

c. Intelligence Sources:

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(1) Accurate intelligence continued to require the collection and evaluation of information from as many sources as possible. Information gathered in late August and early September proved particularly accurate, permitting effective operations against enemy base areas and prevented the Viet Cong from affecting two national elections by terrorism or military action.

(2) Agent Reports: These reports continue to be a major source of information. They are, however, of questionable value individually, but when coupled with other sources assist the intelligence effort.

(3) Tactical Air Reconnaissance: Infra-red, SLAR, the E63 Personnel Detector, photography and the hand-held camera, along with daily visual reconnaissance, assisted in confirming enemy locations.

(a) Infra-red, SLAR. These sensors were used to construct patterns of movement and activity, as well as to confirm enemy locations. Infra-red missions developed a pattern of activity along National Highway 1 during the same period that Troop K had contact in that area. Infra-red was used to negate reports concerning an impending attack on US/GVN Forces in Gia Ray, and confirmed the location of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment in the Hat Dich Secret Zone in August, September and October 1967. SLAR missions showed a pattern of movement just west of the Blackhorse Base Camp. As a result, ambush patrols were frequently positioned in this area. While there was no contact, the ambush patrols may have interdicted an enemy route.

(b) E63 Personnel Detector: The "People Sniffer", like infra-red and SLAR was invaluable in confirming enemy locations. Employment of this new equipment, with a Light Fire Team escort and a Forward Air Controller, permitted immediate response to high potential readings. The 18th Division (ARVN) has employed the "People Sniffer" with ground elements available for airmobile operations in response to findings.

(c) Photography: Photos were used to pinpoint enemy base areas and fortifications. The 541st Military Intelligence Detachment processed the film which was used by the aerial observers. Consequently the results of the imagery interpretation

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were immediately available to the S-2 for exploitation.

(d) Visual Reconnaissance: Daily air reconnaissance continued to be an integral part of the information gathering effort. An additional program was established in which the Regimental Air Cavalry Troop conducted reconnaissance every evening around the Blackhorse Base Camp. These missions were designed to detect possible enemy attempts at attacks by fire on the base camp, as well as detecting any indications of enemy activity in the local areas. The USAF Tactical Air Control Party continued to be an important asset, conducting as many as seven missions daily devoted solely to visual reconnaissance.

(4) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol: This information-collecting agency, taken from the assets of the Aero-Rifle Platoon organic to the Air Cavalry Troop, continued to be a responsive intelligence gathering agency. The LRRP is capable of reacting rapidly to intelligence indicators and forwarding information for evaluation. Documents, weapons and equipment captured by the LRRP, as well as reports forwarded, tended to confirm estimates of enemy locations and probable actions. Moreover, the LRRP proved valuable in terrain assessment for accessibility, trafficability and map corrections.

(5) 541st Military Intelligence Detachment: The bulk of the information collection was accomplished by this unit. The Counterintelligence, Interrogation of Prisoner of War, Imagery Interpretation and Order of Battle sections provided significant data on enemy units, personalities, installations, locations, tactics and activities. Indicators pointed toward a decline in Main Force activity in the Regimental TAOI. Added emphasis was placed on information concerning the local enemy infrastructure. Another innovation included the use of Hoi Chanh personnel on air reconnaissance missions, in conjunction with "People Sniffer" verification, to pinpoint last known enemy locations.

d. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses: The regiment captured many Viet Cong supply and equipment caches during operations in the enemy's base camp areas. More than 1700 enemy fortifications were destroyed, over 11 tons of rice were captured, a Viet Cong ammunition factory was destroyed and a possible Viet Cong

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District Headquarters was overrun. The ammunition factory, although in poor condition, yielded 1 press and 1 forge, indicating local enemy capability of manufacturing weapons and ammunition. The enemy headquarters destroyed by the 3rd Squadron was possibly the Viet Cong Xuan Loc District or the Viet Cong Dinh Quan District Headquarters. US intelligence has not confirmed that this complex, located approximately 5 kilometers south of the Dong Nai River and northwest of Binh Hoa Village, was in fact an enemy District Headquarters. ARVN elements operating with the 3rd Squadron considered it to be an important Viet Cong headquarters. One document tended to confirm the ARVN opinion. This document contained a list of students from a Buddhist Sect in Saigon. Information of this nature, conceivably, would not be contained in a Main Force or Local Force complex.

e. Summary of VC losses this quarter: 47 Viet Cong KIA (BC), 14 Viet Cong KIA (POSS), 2 PW, 81 detainees, 12 small arms, 1 RPG-2, 1 81mm Mortar, 178 mines, 81 structures destroyed, 1712 fortifications destroyed, 11.35 tons rice captured.

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The enemy suffered significant losses of weapons, food and supplies captured as a result of the ten operations in the TAOI. In addition, the Operation EMPORIA jungle clearing will assist in denying the Viet Cong sources of revenue from tax collection points on the highways and facilitate the regiment's rapid reaction to assist RF/PF outposts in the TAOI.

(2) The enemy conducted no major operations, however, he continued to mount sporadic sniping, claymore and mining operations against units in the TAOI.

(3) Pressure was maintained against the Viet Cong in the Hat Dich Secret Zone. As a result of operations in this zone and the occupation of blocking positions on Interprovincial Route 2, a major Viet Cong force was halted in their move from the Hat Dich to the May Tao Secret Zone (see map, Incl 7). A number of Viet Cong base areas were destroyed, denying their use to the enemy.

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(4) Continued emphasis was placed on support of the Revolutionary Development program. Cooperation and coordination between the 11th Cavalry and the 18th Division (ARVN) on combined operations was excellent. One 18th Division operation was supported by units of the regiment while 18th Division units were present on all operations conducted by the Blackhorse Regiment.

(5) The new perimeter defense plan and the Military Police escort of logistical convoys has enabled the regiment to place two squadrons into the TAOI on operations. The return of the 2nd Squadron from the AMERICAL Division in the I Corps Tactical Zone will enable the regiment to mount larger, more effective combat operations in the next quarter.

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted entirely within the TAOR/TAOI (see sketch, Operations, Incl 8 and maps, TAOR/TAOI, Incl 9 & 10).

c. Operation EMPORIA, a road clearing operation along Interprovincial Route 20 initiated on 21 Jul 67, continued until 14 Sep 67. The area of operations included all main lines of communication in Long Khanh Province. The operation was designed to clear away all vegetation 100 meters on both sides of all major routes to reduce the possibility of ambushes along defiles formed by thick jungle, to preclude the halting of traffic under thick canopy for taxation, and to decrease the time required for reaction forces to move to the aid of RF/PF outposts within the TAOI. Phase I, completed during July, consisted of engineer road clearing from the junction of National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 20 (YT3410) along Route 20 to the La Nga River and insertion of a float bridge across the La Nga River (YT484582) by the 15th Engineer Float Bridge Company.

EMPORIA, Phase II (1 - 19 Aug 67), conducted by the 3rd Squadron, with the 52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN) working in close cooperation and coordination, was an extension of Phase I. The mission included securing engineer work parties clearing Route 20 from the La Nga River north to the II Corps Tactical Zone Boundary, using Rome Flow Teams from the 80th Engineer Battalion. The 3rd Squadron established and secured four Forward Support Bases while the 52nd Rangers (ARVN) maintained control of the command terrain east and west of Route 20. The Rangers also conducted aggressive recon-

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naissance of the mountainous areas on both sides of Route 20 near the corps boundary. The 3rd Squadron units and the ARVN Rangers were able to secure as many as six engineer work parties simultaneously, which resulted in maximum utilization of the engineer equipment available. Consequently, the entire road clearing of Route 20 to the corps boundary (EMPORIA Phase I and II) was completed in 27 days, which was half the time originally estimated.

Phase III of EMPORIA (19 - 31 Aug 67) was conducted by the 1st Squadron and consisted of security for engineer work parties along National Highway 1 from the junction with Interprovincial Route 2 (YT4304) to Gia Ray (YT6314). In addition, the 1st Squadron conducted limited search and destroy operations within their area of operations. The clearance of this route has denied the Viet Cong use of ambush sites which they had previously used against the 11th Cavalry on 2 Dec 66 and 21 May 67.

EMPORIA Phase IV (4 - 14 Sep 67) again involved the security of engineer road clearing parties. The 3rd Squadron, with B Company of the 86th Engineers and a Rome Plow team, which were used on previous phases of EMPORIA, cleared Interprovincial Route 2 from Blackhorse Base Camp (YS4496) south to Xa Bang (YS4584). In addition to opening Route 2 as a line of communication, EMPORIA IV contributed significantly to interdicting a major Viet Cong supply line between the Hat Dich Secret Zone and the May Tao Secret Zone.

During all phases of EMPORIA a program of evaluating Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) compounds was initiated in the area of operations. Once evaluated, the engineer platoons of the 919th Engineer Company began efforts to upgrade the defenses of the compounds.

d. Operation VALDOSTA, conducted in two phases, was designed to secure routes to polling places during the Vietnamese National Elections. Search and destroy operations and reaction forces covered the entire TAOI. On 3 Sep 67, 84.7% of the eligible voters in Long Khanh Province voted and 78% of the eligible Vietnamese voted in the lower house election of 22 Oct 67. These facts are an excellent indication of the effectiveness of the two operations and the rapport that has been established between the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 18th ARVN Division and the Province Officials.

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(1) VALDOSTA I (1 - 6 Sep 67): The Blackhorse Regiment extended its influence throughout the TAOI, in conjunction with the 18th ARVN Division, to protect the routes to polling places for the 3 September elections. This operation was conducted by the 1st and 3rd Squadrons with the 1st Squadron occupying four fire support bases/reaction force bases, while the 3rd Squadron secured the base camp and implemented three platoon size search and destroy operations to keep roads open. Troop K had contact with a reinforced VC company at YT2807 on 4 September. Light Fire Teams from the Air Cavalry Troop and Air Force fighters supported the action. Early on 5 September the 1st Battalion, 43rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) moved into blocking positions west of the Viet Cong position, while the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division was airlifted into position southeast of the VC. Search operations uncovered three base camps but were unsuccessful in regaining contact with the Viet Cong.

(2) VALDOSTA II (20 - 23 Oct 67): The mission of Phase II was the same as for Phase I VALDOSTA; to preclude harassment of civilians during the national elections for the lower house on 22 Oct 67. With the return of the 2nd Squadron on 18 - 23 October plus the experience gained from VALDOSTA Phase I, the 11th Cavalry was able to more effectively cover, in conjunction with the 18th ARVN Division, the Tactical Area of Interest. Fire Support/Reaction Force Bases were established to cover polling places and routes to the polls from Interprovincial Route 20 at the La Nga River south to the 1st Australian Task Force TAOR at Xa Bang.

e. Operation ARKANSAS CITY (18 - 23 Sep 67), a reconnaissance in force in the Hat Dich, was initiated in response to intelligence reports that the Viet Cong 274th Regiment intended to move from the Hat Dich Secret Zone across Interprovincial Route 2 to the May Tao Secret Zone. Initially staged as part of the 11th Cavalry's continuing operation, KITTYHAWK, the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, under the operational control of the regiment, and the 3rd Squadron, 11th Cavalry established a series of blocking positions south of base camp along Route 2 to Xa Bang where contact was made with the 1st ATF. The operation became ARKANSAS CITY on 181200H Sep 67 when the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery from the 9th Infantry Division came under the operational control of the 11th Cavalry. These units, with the headquarters of the 1st of the 84th

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Artillery providing the fire support element, conducted search and destroy operations west of Route 2 within the TAOR. Two large base camps were discovered and destroyed. The 3rd Squadron, 11th Cavalry moved from Operation ARKANSAS CITY on 22 September directly to Operation RICHMOND, leaving the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on the operation until 23 September when the 9th Division units left the operational control of the regiment and returned to the 9th Division Base Camp (Bearcat).

On the morning of 25 September 1967, the 1st Squadron, 11th Cavalry moved, with a five platoon task force, to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Operation ARKANSAS CITY. At 251200H Sep 67, this operation became known as ARKANSAS CITY II, conducted by the 1st Squadron plus A and C troops from the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The mission was search and destroy operations west of Route 2 and blocking movement of the Viet Cong 274th Regiment east of the May Tao Secret Zone. On 28 September the 52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN) was airlifted into LZ in the ARKANSAS CITY AO from Operation RICHMOND, where they had been working with the 3rd Squadron, 11th Cavalry. The 52nd Rangers worked in close cooperation/coordination with the 1st Squadron on search and destroy operations west of Route 2. The Rangers were released to the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for operations in the 9th Division TAOI. At this time the 1st Squadron moved their search and destroy operations east of Route 2 while blocking positions were continued along the highway. Operations continued in this area until 9 October. The 1st Squadron had no platoon or troop size engagements during ARKANSAS CITY II.

f. Operation RICHMOND, initiated to upgrade the condition of Interprovincial Route 20, began on 22 Sep 67. The 3rd Squadron moved from Operation ARKANSAS CITY to establish fire support bases (FSB) along Route 20 north of the La Nga River. Of particular significance was the absence of tank support on this operation, a result of the low classification of the Route 20 bridge over the La Nga River. C Battery, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery was airlifted into the FSB to provide fire support. The mission included security of engineer road repair parties along Route 20 from the river to the II Corps Boundary and limited search and destroy operations. On the morning of 26 September, the regiment airlifted, with organic aircraft, two companies of the ARVN 52nd Rangers into landing zones east of Route 20. They joined the other two companies of the

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52nd Rangers and troops of the 3rd Squadron in search and destroy operations. There were only minor contacts during the operation (22 - 28 Sep 67), however, the upgrading of the road added to the security along Interprovincial Route 20 and allowed for an increase in commercial traffic. The road repair was done by A Company, 86th Engineer Battalion, with approximately forty 5 ton dump trucks of gravel convoyed from Long Binh to the area of operation each day. These convoys were escorted by a platoon of military police and an armored cavalry platoon from the ARVN 5th Cavalry as additional security. The 52nd Rangers were airlifted from RICHMOND, on its termination on 28 September, to work with the 1st Squadron on Operation ARKANSAS CITY II.

g. Operation KITTYHAWK: During August and September the regiment's continuing operation consisted of security of base camp, escort of logistical convoys to and from Long Binh and security of the Gia Ray Rock Quarry.

The new perimeter defense plan, and logistical convoy escort plan enabled both the first and third Squadrons to conduct extensive search and destroy operations within the TAOI during October.

h. Other operations:

(1) Operations in conjunction with ARVN Forces:
The 11th Cavalry conducted a number of operations with ARVN and RF/PF forces. These included combined patrols, search and destroy missions, heliborne assaults and security operations. The regiment supported the ARVN Operation QUICKSILVER with fire support, security for fire support bases and reaction forces. Units of the 18th ARVN Division were present on all operations conducted during the reporting period. Of particular significance was the airmobile operation conducted with organic aircraft, during Operation RICHMOND.

The ease with which this operation was conducted further amplifies the degree of cooperation between the Blackhorse Regiment and the 18th ARVN Division and has added another highly mobile

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strike capability to the forces available to the regiment.

(2) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP): The 11th Armored Cavalry Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, organized from the assets of the Air Cavalry Troop's Aero-Rifle Platoon, conducted sixteen patrol missions and five aero-rifle missions during this reporting period.

(a) Organization: A platoon sized unit, the LRRP is organized with four patrol teams of five men each and a headquarters section consisting of a platoon leader, platoon sergeant and three radio operators.

(b) Mission: The mission of the Long Range Reconnaissance patrol is to provide the regiment information based on long range reconnaissance and surveillance. This mission is in addition to the other missions assigned to the Aero-Rifle Platoon. The Regimental S-2 assigns the platoon its LRRP missions based on intelligence reports and needs.

(c) Training: The platoon organized and conducted its own training which was closely supervised by the Regimental S-2. The training included patrolling and ambush techniques, rappelling and a strenuous physical training program. Upon volunteering for the LRRP a trooper must complete the MACV or the 9th Infantry Division Recondo School. Prior to being sent on an actual mission a number of training missions are conducted in the vicinity of base camp to acquaint the new men with the platoon operating procedures under actual field conditions.

(d) Techniques: Once a mission was assigned the platoon leader and patrol leader conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the area of operations to determine possible landing zones, insertion points, extraction points and routes for the patrol. The Regimental S-2 utilized this information to determine the areas to be covered and the method of insertion.

There are three means of insertion: aerial, ground and stay-behind. On aerial insertions the same pilot who flew the reconnaissance flight controlled the insertion. Two UH-1D helicopters, one command and control ship and a light fire team (LFT) were required. The actual insertions were made by the UH-1D and the com-

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mand and control ship by making several false landings before and after the actual insertion. The light fire teams orbited the area not compromising the insertion point but close enough to give immediate support if necessary. Ground insertions were made by dropping the LRRP from a platoon of ACAV moving through an area on a simulated reconnaissance mission. When utilizing the stay behind method of insertion the LRRP moved out with a unit on operation, then remained when the unit departed the area.

Once in an area of operations an area reconnaissance was conducted. As much information was gathered as possible on the enemy's presence, his activity, the terrain and its trafficability without being detected. If the patrol was compromised it took whatever action possible to break contact and moved to the nearest extraction point. A light fire team, command and control ship and two UH-1D were on strip alert, whenever the LRRP was out, in case extraction was necessary. If aerial extraction was not possible then a ground unit was committed to extract the LRRP.

An average mission took four days with the patrol covering approximately 1500 meters a day. It was found that if the patrols tried to cover more than 1500 meters that it was unable to accomplish its mission satisfactorily.

At night the patrols set up secure positions to monitor trails, villages or base camps discovered during the day.

(e) Operations and Plans: September was used primarily to train new men assigned to the platoon. In addition to the individual training at the MACV and the 9th Division Recon Schools, the platoon received training by the 1st Australian Special Air Service.

There were three enemy contacts on the sixteen LRRP missions conducted this quarter. At 071045H Aug, two Viet Cong were observed moving down a trail at YS501871. A hasty ambush was set up utilizing two claymore mines which resulted in 2 Viet Cong KIA (BC). At 251820H Oct, six Viet Cong who were heavily laden with supplies were observed moving down a trail at YT304257 where the patrol had set up their night position. The patrol was compromised and a fire fight ensued resulting in 4 Viet Cong KIA (BC) and one AK-47, two Chicom 7.62mm type 53 bolt action carbines and one Chicom 7.62mm

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Submachinegun type 43 were captured. Six supply packs weighing from forty to sixty pounds were destroyed.

At 271630H Sep, a patrol was sent to the area of the previous contact (YT304258). They observed ten Viet Cong approaching the chateau where the patrol was located. A fire fight ensued resulting in one Chicom 7.62mm type 53 bolt action rifle and 157 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition being captured.

The LRRP had no casualties during the quarter.

In the future it is planned that the platoon will work more closely with the squadrons in assisting them in their missions. The platoon will be utilized to cover areas inaccessible to the ACAV and to deny these areas to the Viet Cong. It is also planned to increase the number of intelligence gathering missions given the LRRP.

(3) Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT). The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment presently has two MAT operating within the Blackhorse Tactical Area of Interest. The personnel on the Mobile Advisory Teams, who volunteer for this advisory duty in remote locations, train and advise the Regional Forces/Popular Forces units in their area of operations. The first team, MAT Lundy, was organized 19 Jul 67 and has been operating at Phuong Lam (YT730493) in northeast Long Khanh Province. The second team, MAT Kosial, was organized 10 Oct 67 and has been operating at Tanh Linh (YT933250), in northern Binh Tuy Province.

(a) Organization: These teams consist of one officer and four enlisted men, one of whom is a qualified medic. The teams are under the operational control of the senior province advisor, however, the regiment remains responsible for administration and logistics.

(b) Mission: The Mobile Advisory Teams are to work with the Regional Forces/Popular Forces in an effort to advise and help them fortify their outposts, train their forces and conduct operations within the capability of the units.

(c) Operations: During this quarter MAT Lundy has organized and trained the artillery battery at its location and

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the RF/PF company near its location so that they have been able to conduct search and destroy missions and heliborne operations. They have also conducted training in the techniques of night ambushes. This teams operations are effective in denying the Viet Cong the opportunity to halt traffic on Route 20 near the II Corps Boundary, for taxation purposes.

MAT Kosiol has been organized only a short period of time, and is the only 11th Cavalry force in northern Binh Tuy Province which was added to our TAOI during October. It is expected that this team will be effective in training the RF/PF forces in the vicinity of Tanh Lanh and will be able to conduct operations in their area of operation and along Route 336 during the next quarter.

(d) Logistics: The Mobile Advisory Teams are supported administratively and logistically by the 11th Armored Cavalry. The barrier material for upgrading of the RF/PF outposts is supplied by the 919th Engineer Company through normal supply channels.

1. Training:

(1) Unit training, maintenance, on the job training, weapons familiarization and seroing were conducted throughout the quarter. During periods of extended tactical operations and especially during maintenance periods while in base camp, maximum utilization of available time enabled small unit leaders to review tactics, techniques and lessons learned. Five day training periods for troop size units were conducted throughout the quarter.

(2) Replacement training was conducted throughout the quarter to prepare new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The training program was reduced to a four day cycle in August, to accomodate the large number of replacements, and expanded to the normal six day cycle at the end of the rotational hump in September. Individual attendance during the quarter was as follows:

August	975
September	373
October	226

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The program of instruction was revised during the quarter to provide for additional USARV mandatory subjects. Additional emphasis was placed on rifle zeroing, mines and booby traps, patrolling, ambushes and counter ambushes.

(3) In addition to the normal replacement school the present school facilities are used to train personnel in patrolling techniques. This is a 3 day course of classroom work dealing with preparation for and actions during an actual patrol. The final exercise of the class is an actual ambush patrol in the TAOR. This course has proven most valuable in preparing individuals from non-combat units for patrols under the new perimeter defense plan.

(4) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School - the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol provided the largest part of the regimental input to the 9th Division Recondo School. However, in keeping with the policy of upgrading our local patrol activities, 12 individuals from the squadrons attended also.

(b) The 9th Division NCO Academy provides basic techniques of military instruction and leadership traits to the NCO and potential NCO of the regiment. Forty-eight students attended the Reliable Academy at Bearcat, RVN during the quarter.

(c) Jungle Survival School. A three day course conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippines was made available to aviation personnel. During the quarter, one aviator attended the course to become familiar with the techniques of jungle survival.

(d) Aircraft Maintenance. The Army Aviation Maintenance Technical Assistance Program (AAMTAP) School, 765th Transportation Group, Vung Tau, administered in-country training to 11 aircraft mechanics from Air Cavalry Troop, Regimental Aviation Platoon and 398th Transportation Detachment.

(e) In addition to the normally scheduled schools an allocation was received from "Tunnel Rat" school, run by the 25th Infantry Division, at Chu Chi RVN. Thirty-six attended this course which dealt with operations inside tunnel complexes, search and destroy, demolition and practical exercise.

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5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Artillery:

(1) General: Artillery fire support provided during the quarter assumed two principal roles; one, support of ground operations by fires on call and preplanned defensive concentrations and secondly, the delivery of harassing and interdicting fires (H&I). Each organic Howitzer Battery continued the direct support mission for its squadron with reinforcing fires being provided by the 54th Artillery Group in the TAOR, TAOI and Areas of Operations (AO). Artillery fires were coordinated and cleared through 18th ARVN Division by the Regimental Fire Support Element in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

(2) Employment and combat operations:

(a) Organic artillery was employed dependent on the mission assigned each squadron. General support artillery was provided by the 54th Artillery Group at Xuan Loc and Nui Dat, which also provided long range fires daily for the logistical convoys between Long Binh and the Blackhorse Base Camp.

(b) During Operation ARKANSAS CITY, HQ, 1/84th Artillery provided a Fire Control Element that operated in the Regimental TOC. This was necessary because the regiment had control of 3 other batteries in addition to organic howitzer batteries. This provided for timely and effective fires on call and expedited the clearance through the 18th Division (ARVN) and the 9th Division. This element also assisted in the air clearance for the firing units through Xuan Loc Artillery Air Warning Control Center.

(3) Ordnance Expended:

August	HE - 4257 rounds
	Illumination - 601 rounds
	White Phosphorus - 117 rounds
September	HE - 6094 rounds

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Illumination - 126 rounds

White Phosphorus - 144 rounds

October HE - 6160 rounds

Illumination - 286 rounds

White Phosphorus - 153 rounds

Yellow Smoke - 40 rounds (marking rounds)

b. Aviation:

(1) General: The Army Aviation elements, consisting of Regimental Aviation Platoon, Squadron Aviation Sections and Air Cavalry Troop, supported the regiment with 17 OH-23, 19 UH-1C, and 12 UH-1D. The parking revetments for protecting the helicopters against mortar attacks were completed, with additional revetments in the maintenance area now under construction. The airfield control tower (AN TSQ 70A), programmed for installation in September, is now expected in December 1967.

(2) Employment: The OH-23 observation helicopters were utilized mainly for command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment at the squadron level. In-country orientation and training of newly arrived aviators was accomplished with a vigorous emphasis on safety.

The UH-1C gunships were employed in aerial fire support, as a rapid reaction force, and in reconnaissance missions.

The UH-1D aircraft were principally utilized for long range reconnaissance patrol insertions and extractions, medical evacuation of the wounded, night command and control, group reconnaissance, and emergency resupply.

(3) Techniques: The observation and communication capabilities of the OH-23G continued to enhance the versatility of the squadrons.

Flying hours for the turbine powered aircraft continued to

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be closely monitored, with positive results becoming apparent during the period. The ammunition feeding trays on the UH-1D armament systems were modified to provide malfunction free firing.

A program of infusion for aviators in the Air Cavalry Troop was instituted to spread the experience of aviators as evenly as possible throughout the year.

A detailed pre-accident plan was developed, published, and distributed to all aviators in the regiment. This plan contains the procedures for accident investigation, plus the primary and alternate means for extraction of downed aircrew members and the security of downed aircraft.

(4) Maintenance: The maintenance facilities for the Aviation Platoon were completely revised to provide for better supervision of personnel. The OH-23 section was incorporated into the Aviation Platoon Maintenance Section and a time compliance check board was set up by the Maintenance Section.

(5) Results: See Army Aviation Statistical Summary, Incl 3.

c. Chemical:

(1) Riot Control Agent Drops, Herbicide Operations, and Personnel Detector Missions were performed by the Regimental Chemical Section and the 33rd Chemical Detachment.

(2) Mannack personnel detectors (modified): On 19 Sep 67 two E-63 personnel detectors were made available on a permanent basis. One more will be made available as soon as it is modified. The 33rd Chemical Detachment has been trained in operation and maintenance of the detectors by the 9th Infantry Division Chemical Section. Consequently the personnel detectors are available daily, adding to the intelligence gathering capability of the regiment.

(3) Herbicide Operations:

(a) The perimeter of the Blackhorse Base Camp has been completely defoliated, however seasonal regrowth has nec-

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essitated continuous defoliation. Highway 1 to the west of Soui Cat has been defoliated from YT555062 to YT574064. One crop destruction mission which was 75% successful, was flown during the quarter to destroy rice crops in the vicinity of Cu My.

(b) The ground based herbicide capability consists of one MO PDDA. Aerial capability is obtained by borrowing the 9th Division Spray device. The 33rd Chemical Detachment is presently constructing a spray device for mounting on the UH-1D helicopter, which will be used primarily for crop destruction and defoliation of small areas. Target date for completion is 10 Nov 67.

d. Air Force:

(1) The Blackhorse Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) continued its program of facilities upgrading. A new personnel bunker was completed through self help and the living quarters were significantly improved. A major cause of concern is the absence of adequate aircraft revetments. The present CBU container revetments offer minimal protection, however, an upgrading program is planned for the next quarter.

(2) During the quarter the TACP completed a night operational recheck. In addition an evaluation was performed of the starlite scope in night visual-reconnaissance (VR) operation. The results of the evaluation at varying altitudes, areas, and times is that the scope is an effective device, however, no sightings which warranted immediate airstrikes were reported.

(3) A significant improvement in intelligence coordination with fire elements was accomplished during this period. S-2 now holds a targeting meeting daily. At this time all fire and support elements are briefed on current order of battle and intelligence data. A daily program of people sniffer, VR, chemical and artillery efforts is agreed to. During sniffer missions a FAC accompanies the sniffer and is available to call immediate airstrikes on significant targets.

(4) An accelerated program had been implemented to improve understanding of air capabilities. The ALO/FAC and fighter pilots have had briefing-question and answer sessions with the squadrons. The results were gratifying to all participants and

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should result in closer liaison and better results.

(5) Initiation of night logistic convoys created additional opportunities for the Air Force to offer support. The TACP holds one aircraft, plane loaded, and two pilots on immediate reaction alert. Ground alert fighters are being held with night ambush ordnance on the alert pad at Bien Hoa to support, on an immediate basis, any attack on 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment convoys.

(6) Results: See Air Force Statistical Summary, Incl 4.

6. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. General: During this quarter the 29th Support Group continued to provide adequate support to the regiment. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company provided point distribution of I through IV Classes of supply. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh, and moved by convoy to the Regiment's ASP at Blackhorse. During tactical operations the squadrons were resupplied by wheel convoy and CH47 (Chinook) aerial sorties.

b. Supply and Maintenance:

(1) Class I: Support was generally rated as excellent, although on occasion, fresh vegetables arrived in a spoiled condition.

(2) Class II and IV:

(a) During this quarter the regiment received fifteen M48A3 tanks to replace high mileage tanks. Six M548 cargo track vehicles were received and 3 each were issued to the Howitzer Batteries of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons. Eighteen M548 are authorized for the regiment. Ninety-eight M113A1 were received and distributed throughout the regiment to replace M113 as part of the dieselization program.

(b) AN/VRC-12 series radios that are in for repair for over 30 days are being returned to the regiment to be turned in for salvage. This reduces the deadline rate, however, requisitions for replacement radios are not being filled. In-

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country assets to replace combat losses are limited and combat losses have a higher priority than items turned in for salvage and replacement.

(3) Maintenance: The regiment received direct support maintenance from the 551st Light Maintenance Company. During this quarter replacement of automotive repair parts improved considerably from the last report. A problem area exists in the time it takes to receive signal major items.

c. Services: The contract laundry at Thu Duc has improved since the last report.

d. Medical:

(1) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment sustained 148 injuries as a result of hostile action during the quarter. Injuries of the lower extremities were the most common injuries, followed in frequency by head injuries and injuries of the upper extremities.

(2) Twenty-four cases of malaria were reported during the quarter. Nineteen of these were reported in the last days of October by elements of the 1st Squadron. A mission conducted by the 1st Squadron from 11 to 19 October was considered to be related to a sudden increase in Falciparum Malaria cases. Beginning on 30 October, all assigned and attached units began daily use of Dapsone, an anti-malarial prophylactic particularly effective against Falciparum Malaria. This pill is taken in addition to the weekly Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet.

(3) The primary means of evacuation of injured personnel was by Dustoff (Med-Evac) helicopter. It would be superfluous, though deserved, to remark upon the great value of Dustoff methods to this command.

(4) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment utilizes the facilities of 7th Surgical Hospital at base camp, and the 93rd Evacuation Hospital and 24th Evacuation Hospital in Long Binh for hospital service. In October, the 36th Evacuation Hospital in Vung Tau was also utilized.

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(5) The 37th Medical Company (CLR) has expanded its facilities during the past three months. The medical company now administers two wards with 12 beds each. The arrival in October of a fourth medical officer has added to the company's effectiveness.

(6) A total of 142 MEDCAP missions were performed and 11,774 patients were treated. Eight DENTCAPS were performed and 117 patients were treated.

(7) A veterinarian, flown in from Long Binh, visits Blackhorse Base Camp on a regular basis. A pet clinic is held in an area adjacent to the Regimental Aid Station, and immunization and treatment are provided.

(8) Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), with the assistance of medics from the Regimental Aid Station, in October began regular fogging (dispersal of insecticide) missions. This technique is considered to be an important preventative medicine measure.

(9) A Regimental Sanitation Officer was appointed in October who insures that health regulations concerning messhalls, barber shops, latrines, and all other facilities at Blackhorse are strictly adhered to.

(10) Considering the conditions under which our troops are operating their health has been quite good.

7. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: During the quarter the operational strength of the regiment went from a low of 99% in late August to a high of 110% in late September. At the end of the quarter operational strength stood at 103%. Replacements were generally well qualified. The serious shortage of Armor Personnel Specialists (MOS 11D) was slowly being alleviated through the replacement stream and the re-classification of personnel MOS, particularly 11B to 11D. The infusion program became effective during the second half of the quarter and approximately 250 EM in grades E1 - E6 were infused with the 9th Infantry Division and the 199th Infantry Brigade. The 2nd Squadron returned to Blackhorse Base Camp during the week 16 - 23 October, thus bring the regiment to full operational

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strength for the first time since April 1967.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by the month are as follows:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>PDY</u>
August	4112	4260	4383
September	4112	4520	4455
October	4144	4388	4394

(2) Hospital Returnees. During the quarter, 229 personnel were returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include the 2nd Squadron, which was attached to the AMERICAL Division for the majority of the quarter.

(3) Casualties:

	<u>WHA</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>	<u>NBD</u>	<u>NBW</u>
August	65	5	0	1	7
September	13	3	0	5	3
October	20	2	0	1	13

c. MOS Shortage: During the reporting period, shortages existed in the 11D series. To offset this, 11B and 11E MOS were substituted with successful results, and without impairing the combat readiness of the regiment. Many of these personnel were reclassified as 11D after serving 60 days in the MOS.

d. Replacements: The quality of replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the squadrons and the replacement training school provided thorough indoctrination of replacements who were being utilized in other than their primary MOS. A primary purpose of the replacement training school is acclimating personnel to their new environment and conditioning their initial apprehensions of being in a combat zone.

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The training program is designed to provide refresher training in basic skills and orientation on the regiment's tactics, equipment and area of operations. Officers and non-commissioned officers are given an orientation which emphasizes troop leading procedures, tactics and safety procedures.

e. Services:

(1) Religious. During the quarter, a total of 243 religious services were conducted with total attendance of 7,062. In addition to the religious services, 138 confessions, 152 communions, and 4 memorial services were conducted. The 243 services were divided as follows: 101 Protestant Services, 140 Catholic Services, and 2 Jewish Services. The 8 chaplains made 124 hospital visits, and 875 interviews and counseling sessions, 11 visits to mens quarters, and 145 visits to the troop training and duty areas.

(2) Red Cross. For the three month period ending October 31, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled 912 cases. In addition, 19 loans for a total of \$2,885, and 5 grants for a total of \$445 were made. A total of 110 Emergency Leaves were granted to personnel at Blackhorse.

(3) Special Services. During the quarter, Special Services continued to present 10 movies each night with an average attendance of 100 persons per show. On 20 August, the "Miss America" show was presented to an audience of almost 2,400 persons. On 22 September, the "Nilda Terrace" show was presented to over 700 persons, and "Americas Children" was presented to over 800 persons on 30 September. The 9th Division Band presented a stage concert on 8 October, to an audience of 300; and on 29 October, the USO Show, "Hello Dolly", with Martha Raye was presented to an audience of over 4,000.

The sports area facilities were increased by the addition of a temporary basketball court, 2 volleyball courts, and 3 horseshoe courts. The amphitheatre has been graded, and work on permanent type seating will begin in the near future. Latrine, washing facilities, and mirrors have been installed in the vicinity of the theatre to further meet the requirements for USO Shows.

(4) Postal. The 7th APU handled 3,830 sacks of incoming mail, and 1,544 sacks of outgoing mail during the quarter.

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A total of \$1,083,060.55 worth of money orders, and \$29,309 worth of stamps were sold. In addition, 1,414 pieces of registered mail and 835 pieces of insured mail were accepted.

(5) Red Cross Clubmobile. The clubmobile continued its weekly schedule of 33 visits to the units at base camp, and 3 afternoon visits to the field. The schedule is currently being modified to accommodate the 2nd Squadron.

A birthday card program was started in which the First Sergeant of all units provides the clubmobile with the birth dates of their troopers, and the girls, in turn, send birthday cards to the men through the First Sergeant.

During September, the Clubmobile conducted an Athletic Field Day. The events were: Basketball, Volleyball, Horseshoes, 220 yard relay, 100 yard dash, and the 2 mile cross country run.

An awards night is planned for the first place unit, 3rd Squadron Howitzer Battery, in the near future.

The girls also participated in the welcoming ceremonies for the return of the 2nd Squadron on 18 October.

(6) Post Exchange. During the quarter, the Blackhorse Post Exchange was changed from a site exchange to a branch exchange by the acquisition of two other previous site exchanges on 10 September. The two agencies are both located in Xuan Loc. In addition, a snack bar was opened on 19 October, the first one at Blackhorse (see Incl 5, PX Sales Figures).

f. Morale. A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The new PX Snack Bar and USO shows directly contributed to the men's morale.

g. Awards and Decorations:

Submitted	Approved	Pending (this quarter)	Pending (last quarter)
DSC	1	0	

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LM	3	3	1	
SS	14	16	2	1
DFC	12	14	5	
BS	134	265	131	8
AM	391	357	348	18
ACM	102	189	142	5

In addition, a total of 120 Purple Hearts were awarded.

h. POW. The Blackhorse Detachment of the 720th Military Police Battalion processed 18 detainees during the quarter. Of these, one was deemed a POW and was evacuated to the III Corps POW compound.

1. Maintenance of discipline, law and order:

(1) Courts Martial: During the quarter the following courts martial were processed:

	<u>Tried</u>	<u>Pending</u>
General	1	1
Special	1	0
Summary	10	2

(2) Serious Incidents. There were no serious incidents reported.

(3) During the quarter, the largest number of MP reports concerned traffic violations, with larceny second. Formal MP patrols continued around base camp.

j. Problems: At the present time the regiment is experiencing difficulty in receiving assignment instructions. In some cases instructions are not received until 10 days prior to the date

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of rotation. This situation causes extreme hardship to personnel with families, delayed shipment of hold baggage and general inconvenience to already overworked personnel sections.

Some personnel continue to arrive without personnel records and allied papers. This situation usually results in financial hardship and frequently results in congressional inquiries.

Personnel in grades E-5 and above who have profiles that preclude their participating in field operations continue to be assigned. These personnel normally must be assigned to unauthorized positions which count against the regiment's combat strength.

This unit has not been receiving up to date information on the awarding of proficiency pay, which may be causing errors in the awarding of proficiency pay to personnel of the regiment.

The above problems have all been brought to the attention of the appropriate offices of AG, USARV.

8. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: The PSYOPS program of the regiment has provided extensive support for tactical operations, the Chieu Hoi program, civic action, and the Vietnamese elections which took place during this quarter.

a. 11,373,400 leaflets were dropped in Long Khanh Province during 95 aerial missions for the regiment. A new program was initiated; safe conduct passes, rally and sanitation leaflets were handed out during MEDCAP. Fifty-six hours, 15 minutes of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were made during 87 missions. Nine hours four minutes of ground loudspeaker broadcasts were made during 6 missions.

b. Before and during the Presidential and Senatorial Elections and those for the house of representatives, tapes were played urging people to vote. The regiment does not have the capability of conducting surveys to determine the impact of these tapes.

c. A new series of sanitation leaflets and a tape were developed by the attached CA platoon and PSYOP team. These were first used during October and it is too early to determine their impact.

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d. The regiment has had only one rallier during the quarter. This may mean that ralliers tend to go to ARVN units, to RF/PF units, or directly to Chieu Hoi Centers, however, there is insufficient information to determine the reasons for this lack of Chieu Hoi.

e. The attitude of the majority of the population in Long Khanh Province towards the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment seems favorable.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. The regiment continued to improve its program of civil affairs activities during this quarter with main emphasis placed on improving and regularizing civic action.

b. MEDCAP: The Medical Civic Action Program was revised twice to improve the medical treatment provided to the Vietnamese and to fit the administration of the program into tactical requirements.

(1) Three hamlets were selected where announced MEDCAP would be held. All three hamlets had vietnamese dispensaries, thus the doctor could help train local health workers at the same time he provided medical attention. In addition, unannounced MEDCAP were continued in other hamlets. By announcing the MEDCAP's return, patients could come from a greater distance for treatment.

(2) After some initial problems in locating health workers and establishing the proper interval between MEDCAP visits, the program settled into a working routine. The regular schedule also provided an opportunity for interrogation prisoner of war (IPW) teams to accompany the MEDCAP team which improved their ability to develop intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(3) This initial experiment in announced MEDCAP did not cover all areas assigned to the regiment by Long Khanh Sector. In addition, the administrative arrangements did not provide for either the return of the 2nd Squadron, or for continuing the program while the regiment was in the field for extended periods. Consequently the program was revised a second time. This revision established five announced MEDCAP throughout Xuan Loc District. Each of these would continue under the regimental rear detachment, aided

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by tenant units on the base camp during the regiment's dry season operations. Ten unannounced MEDCAP were also usually scheduled per week.

(4) Under these two programs, 142 MEDCAP were conducted and 11,774 patients examined. Eight DENTCAP were also conducted, treating 117 patients. During each month of the quarter, the number of MEDCAP patients decreased although the number of MEDCAP remained relatively constant. Many factors can contribute to this, but it seems that two major factors are the regularity of MEDCAP in given areas, coupled with the close association of the US doctors with Vietnamese health workers. Regular visits reduce the number of people who just join the line for the novelty of the MEDCAP. The health worker and the doctor who returns frequently are also better able to segregate those needing treatment from those who merely want medicine to hedge against minor illnesses.

b. The improvement of Regional and Popular Force outpost defenses was another program which received considerable emphasis. This is of concern to both civil affairs and military operations and involved both the Regimental S-3 and S-5.

(1) This program began in May 1967. Fifty-one outposts in Long Khanh Province were surveyed for defensibility and to determine what barrier material was needed. A classification from A through D (see Incl 6 for standards) was to be assigned each outpost depending on its condition and emphasis placed on improving all outposts to at least class B by 31 December 1967.

(2) Since the beginning of August, eight outposts have been upgraded to a higher class, three showed no improvement, and nine outposts were class B or better. A re-survey effort is still in progress.

(3) During August, the regiment supervised US engineers in building one new outpost in the northern part of the province, raising the total number of outposts to 52.

(4) This program has moved slowly because of the slowness of Vietnamese response and because of the slowness of our own resurveys of the outposts. During November, the program will be re-organized and a full-time team will be formed at regimental level

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insure that material issued is used and that re-surveys are accomplished more rapidly.

c. During this quarter, the 1st Squadron adopted Hien Kinh Village, Xuan Loc District, for civic action projects. The squadron has repaired roads, installed and repaired culverts, and taken a particular interest in MEDCAP in this village. This expands a program begun by the 3rd Squadron in Cam My Village, Xuan Loc District.

d. In early October, 385 refugees were resettled in Binh Loc Hamlet, Xuan Loc District. The regiment has been active in providing these refugees with scrap lumber and over 7000 pounds of captured rice, all in coordination with Xuan Loc District. These refugees have used the lumber to help build new homes in Binh Loc.

e. The regiment continued to support the 43rd Regiment (ARVN) and 52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN) as they built new dependent housing. The major successful projects were ground clearing and filling by the 919th Engineer Company. As the engineer company is available, more work will be done on an access road to the 43rd Regiment's housing area.

f. The attached civil affairs platoon (11th AA Platoon, 2nd CA Company) aided the Xuan Loc Hospital by providing paint and screen during October. These items were badly needed to improve the appearance and sanitation of the hospital. The hospital has employed painters and that part of the project has progressed relatively well, however the platoon is still trying to obtain sufficient screen for the windows. In addition, the 37th Medical Company and the 7th Surgical Hospital each began a program of sending a doctor one day per week to the hospital to aid with treatment and advise on sanitation, administration, supplies, and facilities. This program has worked well since mid-September and contributes directly to improving the Vietnamese health environment.

g. The regiment, using attached engineers, built or repaired the following this quarter:

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| (1) Bridges: | 3 |
| (2) Culverts: | 4 |

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- (3) Road repair 10.7 Kilometers
- (4) Wells 1

h. The following commodities were distributed:

- (1) Clothing: 126 pounds
- (2) Food: 17,323 pounds
- (3) Lumber: 39,910 board feet
- (4) School kits: 400 each
- (5) Soap: 677 bars
- (6) Tin sheets: 40 each (in addition to RF/PF distribution)
- (7) Shovels/Hoes: 273 each
- (8) Rice: 23,395 pounds (returned captured rice)

i. In summary, the regimental civic action program has continued to pursue both rapid, high impact projects in the province in conjunction with more extensive, long term projects limited to Xuan Loc District.

10. (U) INFORMATION:

a. During the period of 1 August to 31 October the 17th Public Information Detachment concentrated on increased quality in the Home Town News Program and initiated an active taped news program.

b. A total of 1537 releases were forwarded to the Army Home Town News Center, with 205 accompanying pictures. Seventy-two taped interviews and 139 holiday greeting tapes were also forwarded.

c. Sixty-nine news releases and 57 photo releases were given general distribution.

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- d. Six news representatives were provided support.
- e. Two taped field reports were submitted to AFVN.
- f. The lack of news representatives visiting the regiment was due mainly to the lack of headline type activities during the quarter.

11. (C) BASE CAMP:

a. Development: Progress continued on the development of Camp Blackhorse throughout the quarter, even though the majority of the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 919th Engineer Company were deployed on other missions. The engineer effort consisted of completion of the administrative buildings for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Squadrons, building dog kennels for the 46th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, continued progress on the completion of troop/company/battery orderly room-supply room buildings and pouring of concrete pads for unit day rooms which are being completed through the self-help program.

Maintenance continued on the camp drainage system in the form of repairs to culverts and reshaping of headwalls when necessary because of monsoon rains. The 591st Light Equipment Company of the 27th Engineer Battalion continued maintenance of the roads in base camp and conducted maintenance of Evans Airfield. A new runway was begun, which will accommodate C123's when completed during the next quarter. The upgrading of the helicopter revetments was completed during the quarter.

The 919th Engineer Company (Armored), which supported the regiment on all operations during the quarter, supported base camp development with elements of the company not involved in field operations. These elements assisted in construction of administration buildings and provided technical assistance for units involved in self-help construction. In order to ease the 2nd Squadron's return to Blackhorse, the 919th Engineers helped to rehabilitate the squadron's showers and poured a number of self-help concrete pads so they would be ready for construction.

The new base camp security plan has given each of the tenant units responsibility for security of a portion of the perimeter.

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In conjunction with security, the using units were made responsible for the conditions of the bunkers, and towers in their sectors. As a result of this plan the condition of the perimeter bunkers and towers has improved.

Water continues to be provided by a spring fed lake with purification facilities provided by the 27th Engineer Battalion. During this reporting period there were 4,144,000 gallons of potable water consumed. Consumption rates were: 44,000 gallons per day during August, September and 1 through 15 October; 50,000 gallons per day during 16 through 31 October.

b. Problems: The 11th Armored Cavalry continues to be hindered by the lack of a support battalion and requirements relating to the management of the base camp. The Regimental Executive Officer is forced to function as provisional support battalion commander and deputy base camp commander in addition to his primary function of executive officer for the regiment. The S-4 must function as a logistical operator with a staff originally designed to operate as a planning, supervisory staff for the squadron S-4 who are the logistical operators. The S-4 must also plan, supervise and control post maintenance, logistical convoys, requisitioning and supply of ammunition, the ammunition supply point and processing of hold baggage. The Regimental Adjutant must also function as the Post Adjutant General. The Regimental Personnel Section, originally designed to handle Regimental Headquarters personnel actions, is now responsible for the provisional squadron and attached units in addition to controlling replacements and port calls for the entire regiment. In addition the regiment must operate an airfield, water point, sanitary fill and post signal facility.

As a result of these problems and the additional personnel requirement for strictly base camp operations, a TDA was submitted to HQ USARV on 9 Nov 67. The TDA requests authorization of an augmentation to the Regimental Headquarters so that it may function as a support battalion without hindering its primary function of assisting the commander in his command of the regiment. It further requests an augmentation of personnel for strictly base camp functions, e.g. post exchange, special services, reenlistment, replacement, inspector general, club personnel, water point, supply point and baggage procuring personnel (see Section II, Recommendations, Paragraph 2d).

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SECTION II

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Intelligence:

(1) Item: Rapport with ARVN and RF/PF.

Discussion: The local ARVN and RF/PF forces have knowledge of the terrain and the people. They are able to detect subtle changes in the daily routine of villages which would be unnoticed by US Forces. They are also able to supply information concerning the enemy activity in the area.

Observation: Establishment and continuance of good rapport with ARVN and RF/PF forces assists the units in the accomplishment of missions, particularly when operating in new operational areas.

(2) Item: Proper exploitation of Intelligence.

Discussion: During the quarter units conducting search and destroy operations, within the TAOI, had to be withdrawn from these operations before the situation could be fully developed.

Observation: Usually initial intelligence only directs a unit to a general area. Once in this area tangible results are often dependent upon the gathering of more immediate information which may take several uneventful days. Sufficient time should be allowed for an operation to fully exploit additional intelligence gained in an area of operations. A unit which rapidly enters and departs an area will miss significant opportunities and allow the enemy to easily evade in place.

(3) Item: Location of Viet Cong Base Camps.

Discussion: It has become apparent that the Viet Cong are very systematic in setting up base camps and fortified positions. These camps are invariably located very close

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to streams or other sources of water, and are usually established close to populated villages, for resupply and entertainment. Major installations are often found along RVN political boundaries since the VC have found that forces from one province will usually not cross province boundaries.

Observation: These positions should be taken into consideration when planning and conducting operations. They should also be taken into consideration when planning for visual reconnaissance, harassing and interdictory fires, and utilization of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols.

(4) Item: Hiding Places in Base Camps.

Discussion: The Viet Cong often conceal equipment and documents within 100 meters of their base camps in well hidden positions. Documents and other information of intelligence value have been found in the walls of bunkers, buried in lumber piles and deep in hollow trees. Tunnel entrances concealed in the floors of bunkers were discovered by detonating a claymore or other demolition inside the bunker.

Observation: Subordinate units must be instructed on the number of possible hiding places which the Viet Cong utilize so that each base camp is thoroughly searched. Documents and other items of intelligence value gained from detailed searching may be used by the unit for immediate exploitation in addition to forwarding them for a more detailed intelligence examination.

b. Operations:

(1) Item: Value of Long Term Help for Specific Areas.

Discussion: The value of long term help for specific areas by a given unit was strikingly demonstrated this quarter. The village area of Cam My (YS4692) has been helped by the 3rd Squadron for many months. Medical assistance has been given and food stuffs, clothing, and toys have been distributed regularly. A village TV set has been purchased. English has been taught to 18 local teachers, each of whom now conducts English classes. Many combined operations have been conducted. RF and PF posts have been upgraded. Villagers have been hired to assist in

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road clearing operations and arrangements are being made with the Montagnard villagers to make native articles (such as baskets and crossbows) for sale as Christmas presents to US personnel.

Observation: The impact of the overall program has been significant. During September the squadron was requested by the village chief to assist in providing security on election day so that residents of four outlying hamlets could travel to the polling place. This was done by two platoons of L Troop. Although threats had been received by the village officials no terrorism was undertaken by the local Viet Cong. The villagers of Cam My registered the largest percentage of voters among all villages in the province (nearly 100%).

(2) Item: Follow-up Operations.

Discussion: Returning to an area a second time may be productive since the Viet Cong often have reentered the area shortly after US Troops departed.

Observation: Reentry Operations should be conducted whenever possible in Viet Cong suspected areas even though there was little contact on the initial operation. Artillery fires or a stay behind patrol have also been used effectively.

(3) Item: Action upon encountering mines.

Discussion: When mines are encountered, always sweep the entire area for additional mines. Experience has shown that in most cases, where there is one mine, others will be positioned nearby.

Observation: Never allow personnel to group together in the immediate vicinity where there has been a mine detonation, nor assume any area to be safe without prior checking.

(4) Item: Actions taken in case of booby traps.

Discussion: The majority of Viet Cong road blocks encountered are of hasty construction, usually small hand carried brush and trees placed across the road. While the majority of these are not mined or booby trapped, injury has been caused by

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the mining of these obstacles.

Observation: All road blocks must be treated as though mined and/or booby trapped and cleared with grappling hooks or explosives used to clear them. Under no circumstances should they be cleared by hand.

(5) Item: Reaction to enemy contact.

Discussion: Rapid reaction in providing sufficient forces to exploit or contain an established Viet Cong contact is essential. A few hours delay, particularly overnight, will almost always insure that the Viet Cong are successful in their attempts to withdraw from the point of contact and make good their escape.

Observation: All attempts should be made to quickly and effectively introduce additional forces into an area of established contact to prevent the Viet Cong from withdrawing or escaping.

(6) Item: Traffic Control Points.

Discussion: The necessity for promptly establishing traffic control points manned by a combination of ARVN and US personnel was demonstrated during road repair and clearing operations on Highway 20. Traffic was initially congested, pointing out the need for closer coordination between US and District officials. Through the experience gained on EMPORIA I arrangements were made for better traffic control and the use of Vietnamese to assist in the control of the civilian traffic enabled problems to be held at a minimum during the operation and no major road blocks resulted in spite of extensive culvert construction and major military convoy operations.

Observation: The close coordination of US and District (Dinh Quan) officials made this possible. Both military and civilian traffic was controlled by TCP. Arrangements should be made to establish similar traffic control posts whenever planned operations will interfere or disrupt the normal flow of civilian traffic.

(7) Item: Reaction to Ambush Warning.

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Discussion: The Viet Cong may give a false warning of an impending ambush to determine the reaction of US Forces, to harass, disrupt or slow operations or to get US Forces to fire on civilians or ARVN soldiers.

Observation: No warning can be ignored, however, extreme caution must be observed to preclude firing on civilians or ARVN soldiers. The person giving the warning must be detained for questioning by an interpreter. The pattern of reaction must be varied and extra care exercised in controlling fires.

(8) Item: Water in Landing Zones.

Discussion: Often, landing zones cannot be physically checked prior to operations.

Observation: In cases where an LZ could possibly be under water artillery can be fired into the area which will uncover the water under any heavy grass cover.

(9) Item: Smoke Grenade.

Discussion: Due to the extremely thick jungle canopy, it is imperative that a sufficient amount of smoke be carried at all times. This is particularly true when elements are dismounted. As a minimum, each individual should carry one smoke grenade.

Observation: The thick jungle makes ground navigation extremely difficult, thus, the need for an air observer becomes acute. The only effective way to mark for the observer is by the use of smoke and many times this required two or more grenades to penetrate the canopy.

(10) Item: Dismounted Patrolling.

Discussion: Armor personnel are frequently hesitant to dismount from their vehicles. However, experience has shown that the most effective way to locate Viet Cong installations is to dismount and conduct detailed searches.

Observation: Armored personnel should be trained

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and prepared to conduct dismounted operations. Experience has taught that armored vehicles crashing through the jungle often obliterate the various indicators that lead to substantial finds. These indicators include small trails, bent grass and off color spots in the jungle which cannot be identified when mounted.

(11) Item: Viet Cong Base Camp Destruction:

Discussion: Destroying Viet Cong base camps and tunnels by explosives is very time consuming and generally incomplete.

Observation: The use of one romo plow and one dozer tank attached to an engineer platoon has proven to be the fastest and most complete method of destruction. Additionally, the plow/dozer team can clear LZ for the evacuation of the items found and roads leading to the Viet Cong base camp.

(12) Item: ACAV Reaction Course.

Discussion: An extremely beneficial training vehicle is the ACAV reaction course. This course is very easy to set up and conduct. During this course, targets are engaged using all available weapons. It is a miniature TCPC with a part of the course requiring the crew to dismount and clear a road block.

Observation: This course provides new personnel an opportunity to familiarize themselves in something other than a firing range atmosphere. It provides experienced personnel an opportunity to increase their skills and creates competition between crews resulting in higher standards and a better trained crew.

(13) Item: Mines and Booby Traps.

Discussion: During Operation ARKANSAS CITY II several casualties were caused by claymore anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines. In many cases tactical requirements prohibited avoidance of these booby traps, however, proper preventive measures could have reduced the number of these casualties.

Observation:

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(a) Do not use the same trail or road when extracting from the jungle after an operation. If the terrain situation requires that the same trail be used, it should be considered booby trapped or mined and cleared accordingly. Tanks should lead the column.

(b) During dismounted operations, it is imperative that dispersion be maintained at all times. Defiles, fords, and natural obstacles which tend to canalize or mass dismounted troops are normally selected by the Viet Cong to emplace booby-traps.

(c) Watch for indicators: During Operation ARKANSAS CITY II, a mine was emplaced on a road near a culvert site which canalized the troop into the mined area. Later search of the area revealed a sign in Vietnamese warning civilian traffic to avoid use of this road.

(14) Item: Viet Cong mines in or near metal culverts.

Discussion: The Viet Cong on Highway 1 in the I Corps Tactical Zone emplace a large majority of their mines above a metal culvert. The effect of this tactic is to confuse the inexperienced mine detector operator. Unless proper mine detection techniques are utilized, the operator tends to disregard a metallic return above a culvert because he assumes it is the culvert he has detected.

Observation:

(a) The proper method of detecting a mine above a metal culvert is to adjust the sensitivity of the mine detector until it picks up the culvert. Then reduce the sensitivity gradually until the culvert is no longer detected. Sweep the area over the culvert. By properly adjusting the sensitivity of the mine detector in the above manner only those metallic objects above the culvert will be detected.

(b) Additional steps should be taken by mine sweep personnel to search the inside of the culvert and the area outside both ends of the culvert for wires or freshly dug holes.

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(15) Item: Viet Cong Routes of Withdrawal.

Discussion: In the I Corps Tactical Zone the 2nd Squadron found that the Viet Cong invariably withdrew from contact away from Highway 1, a relatively secure highway for friendly traffic. Successful operations occurred when elements of the squadron moved as rapidly as possible to a position between the reported enemy location and his normal base area and then conducted a sweep toward the Viet Cong and Highway 1. This course of action had two advantages:

(a) The longer the sweep continued, the more secure the area became, since the unit moved toward Highway 1.

(b) When Viet Cong were encountered they had no place to evade to except into a friendly secure area.

Observation: Conduct sweeps by rapidly moving deep into an insecure area and sweeping toward a secure area. Necessary precautions must be taken to establish an adequate rear guard element.

(16) Item: Mine sweeping Operations.

Discussion: The Viet Cong use both pressure and command detonated anti-tank mines. The mine will often be emplaced by digging in from the sloped shoulder of the road far enough to position the mine, so that the surface of the roadway remains undisturbed.

Observation: Mine Detectors are not infallible. In addition to the usual 2 men, each team should have 2 additional men for a total of 4 personnel for each mine sweeping team. The additional men advance on line with the sweepers off the shoulder of the road or in the contiguous drainage ditch. As the team progresses, they visually inspect the shoulder and side slope of the road, or side of the ditch for visible indications of removal or disturbance of the road shoulder. They are equipped with a hooked rod and as they advance, they force the hook below the ground surface and draw the hook toward themselves, cutting 2-3" deep furrows. This latter procedure will normally provide positive and rapid indication of the presence of a command detonated mine, since the

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Viet Cong normally lay electrical wires under only a loose layer of dirt.

(17) Item: Requests for Crop Destruction:

Discussion: Request for crop destruction should be planned well in advance. Once the crops appear the normal processing time for the request will probably allow the crops to be harvested by the Viet Cong.

Observation: Blanket request for suspected areas should be submitted well in advance for both ground and aerial spray. Once approval has been granted, this will allow crops to be destroyed as they appear.

c. Personnel:

(1) Item: Infusion.

Discussion: An important problem, faced by the 11th Cavalry, as well as any other unit deployed to Vietnam, is overcoming the strain of a personnel rotational "hump". An infusion program, designed to relieve the pressure of 100% rotation of experienced personnel one year following arrival, must be instituted.

Observation: A time-phased transferral of personnel between in-country units must be forced on units within 90 days of arrival in Vietnam. Although losing 10% of their trained personnel per month is a difficulty to individual unit commanders, the disorganization resulting from a 50% - 75% turnover at one time is considerably more crippling to the entire command

d. Civil Affairs:

(1) Item: Captured Viet Cong Grains.

Discussion: Rice and other food grains captured from Viet Cong depots were taken into the largest nearby friendly village and distributed under the direction of the village chief. This was particularly successful during Operation VALDOSTA when grain was delivered to the village vicinity YT2610. This village has previously provided substantial intelligence information to

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members of the 11th Cavalry and the reaction to the regiment's success was excellent.

Observation: Providing captured rice and other food stuffs to the villages that have proved friendly and provided assistance is an effective means for maintaining good relations and exploiting success.

(2) Item: Civil Road Repair Work.

Discussion: Extensive road clearing operations conducted during the quarter have necessitated repair of roads in Long Khanh Province.

Observation: The Dinh Quan district road repair team had been working for several weeks prior to the arrival of US Engineers. Efforts must be made to involve the local public work teams so they will not become discouraged and lose incentive in the face of massive US assistance.

(3) Item: Organization of MEDCAP.

Discussion: For the MEDCAP to be of benefit, it must be organized so the same interpreter is with a doctor at all times. Prepared instructions both in English and Vietnamese which are passed out with the medicine have proven to be very helpful.

Observation: This method saves time with each patient and in villages which are visited regularly, it provides the doctor with some background into the patients medical problems.

2. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Observation: The M548 cargo carriers, which are used extensively for resupply, sustained heavy damage to the drivers compartment. This damage resulted from hitting vines and branches while moving down trails which had previously been cleared by ACAV and tanks.

Recommendation: The driver's compartment is considered too fragile for the type of terrain in which the 11th Armored Cav-

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ally is habitually working. Reinforcing bars are needed for the driver's compartment, particularly along the windshield frames. Reinforcing bars are currently being fabricated for the driver's compartment, and, if successful, will be forwarded as an equipment improvement recommendation.

b. Observation: At the present time no suitable provision exists for storing or securing individual weapons, i.e. M16 rifles in ACAV. Individuals weapons are presently stored or secured on a "convenience" basis on C rations, ammo basic loads, propped in corners, or secured on top of the vehicle.

Recommendation: Weapons racks similar to those found in the M577 command track should be installed on the right side inside wall of the M113(A1), opposite the radios. Provisions for 5 or 6 rifles should be made. Individual weapons would be accessible and less vulnerable to damage. A limited number of these will be installed to determine the effectiveness of the racks. The M113 has racks for two weapons in the driver's compartment, however this is not sufficient. A modification work order will be submitted if successful.

c. Observation: The 4.2 inch mortar is an excellent support weapon if used in mass and under the control of the headquarters responsible for, and capable of, coordinating the fires. Experience has shown that:

(1) The armored Cavalry platoon cannot secure the organic mortar squad in a guerrilla warfare environment.

(2) Consolidation of the organic mortars at troop level is not practical due to the coordination required to fire indirect fire in Vietnam.

(3) To be effective, the mortars must have centralized control and be provided with a fire direction center capability. Since arrival in Vietnam, the mortars have habitually been consolidated at squadron level with the fire direction center capability being furnished by the howitzer battery. This arrangement, while effective, provides limited flexibility and places a burden on the howitzer battery Fire Direction Center.

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At the present time, there are only three forward observer (FO) parties available to the squadron. Due to the combat operating conditions in Vietnam, the usual employment of the tank company is as a cross-reinforced maneuver element. The tank company must have an FO party available to function in this capacity. Also, the present FO sections are mounted in $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks. Experience has shown that these vehicles cannot traverse the terrain encountered in our area of operation. The usual procedure is to mount the FO party in an M113 personnel carrier (ACAV) organic to the supported unit.

The ground surveillance section has marginal effectiveness at troop/company level because of the nature of the terrain and tactical operating conditions in Vietnam. Squadron commanders have habitually consolidated the ground surveillance sections at squadron level because of their limited application in the jungle terrain and the problem of securing individual teams.

In the present configuration this unit has no tanks organic to the armored cavalry troop. During the time this regiment has been in Vietnam, the troops have usually been cross-reinforced with the organic company. This system does not maintain the integrity of the tank platoon and does not provide the number of tanks necessary for most operations.

Since arrival in Vietnam, experience has shown that:

- (1) The tank company did not have a patrolling or dismounted capability.
- (2) The tank company could not adequately secure itself at night in a guerrilla warfare environment.
- (3) The tank company was habitually cross-reinforced as a combined arms unit.
- (4) The cavalry squadron did not have a force which could be airlifted as a fast reaction force when necessary. In view of the fact that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has been operating as a separate regiment, all of the above requirements are necessary.

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AVIC-WE

20 November 1967

Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67
(RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WAY6TO) (U)

It has been shown over a year's combat operations by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam that the tank company commander must have a more functional control headquarters vehicle. Task organizing has enabled the tank company to operate on a parity with the armored cavalry troops, but control capability is very limited.

Recommendations:

(1) All organic mortars should be consolidated at squadron level in the howitzer battery. Six mortar squads should be employed. Three mortar squads should be deleted and the personnel used to form a fire direction center consisting of a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, one instrument operator, and one personnel carrier driver. The FDC should be equipped with the M577 Command Post Carrier.

(2) An additional FO team, consisting of one forward observer, one recon sergeant, one carrier driver and two senior scout observers, should be added to the howitzer battery FO section. In addition, all FO teams should be mounted in the M113 (ACAV) personnel carrier and two senior scout observers should be added to each FO team to serve as machinegunners. The present radio telephone operator/driver should be redesignated as a personnel carrier driver.

(3) A small, consolidated, ground surveillance section in the headquarters troop better meets the needs of this unit. Four AN/PPS-5 radar teams should be authorized for this purpose.

(4) Two M113 (ACAV) personnel carriers should be deleted from each armored cavalry platoon and replaced with two tanks. This would provide the required number of tanks, provide for cross-reinforcement, and maintain the integrity of the tank platoon in the tank company.

(5) One tank platoon should be deleted from the tank company and replaced with one mechanized infantry platoon. The platoon should be composed of four infantry squads mounted in M113 personnel carriers. The composition of each squad should be exactly the same as the infantry squad now authorized for each armored cavalry platoon.

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Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67
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(6) One M577 Command Post vehicle and a crew consisting of one vehicle commander, one senior radio operator, one radio operator, and one carrier driver should be authorized for each tank company.

All of the above recommendations were submitted to the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, on 21 October 1967 as part of a Golf series MTOE for the Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, Vietnam.

d. Observation: During the months of September and October 1967, a study was conducted by this headquarters to determine the impact base camp requirements had on our combat capabilities. During the conduct of this study it was determined that 244 essential duty positions were required just for base camp administration and services. For the most part, these duty positions had been filled by excess personnel. In view of the current army-wide personnel shortages and the reduction of this unit to TOE strength, either some of these essential functions will have to be curtailed or these functions performed with our combat resources. The latter course of action represents an unacceptable burden on our combat capabilities. It should be noted that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is the only separate regiment/brigade in Vietnam not authorized a support battalion for these functions.

Recommendation: It is essential that some provisions be made to support Blackhorse. On 9 November 1967 a proposed camp TD was submitted to the Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, requesting authorization of 244 personnel to fill duty positions required for base camp administration and services.


ROY W. FARLEY
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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AVDE-CS

1st Ind

SSG Cooke/clm/BRCT-2301

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67 (RCS CSFOR
-65)(UIC WAY6TO)(U) dated 20 Nov 67.

Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division APO 96370 26 DEC 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-REH, APO 96266

This Headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the inclosed Operational
Report-Lessons Learned from Headquarters 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John S. Noel, Jr.
R. H. PHELPS
CPT. AGC
Asst. A. G.

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AVFBC-RE-H (20 Nov 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO) (U)


DA HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 30 DEC 1967

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following comments:
 - a. p 7, para 3,c,(3)(a). Infrared surveillance cannot identify units. The paragraph should read: Confirmed the location of enemy activity in the HAT DICH, the normal operational area of the 274th VC Regt.
 - b. p 8, p 15-17, p 19. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol should read Long Range Patrol and is properly abbreviated LRP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. E. WAMBSGANS
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG

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AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 67) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67
(RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WAY6TO) (U)

24 JAN 1968

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (AY6A) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning:

(1) Consolidation of mortars at squadron level, page 50, paragraph (1).

(2) Additional forward observer team for the tank company, page 50, paragraph (2).

(3) Consolidation of ground surveillance at squadron level, page 50, paragraph (3).

(4) Deletion of two M113 and addition of two tanks to each cavalry platoon, page 50, paragraph (4).

(5) Deletion of one tank platoon in each tank company and addition of one mechanized infantry platoon, page 50, paragraph (5).

(6) Addition of M577 CP vehicle to each tank company headquarters, page 51, paragraph (6).

MTOE to reorganize the armored cavalry squadron including the above requirements were presented to the DA Standardization Team during Phase II of USARV Standardization. The DA Team nonconcurred with the proposed MTOE based upon the MACOV Study. After DA approval of the MACOV Study, the squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment will be reorganized following the approved MACOV recommendations.

b. Reference item concerning base camp and administration, page 51, paragraph d. Additional personnel spaces are not available at this time to provide increased authorization in TOE units for base camp administrative support. This headquarters is currently developing an MTOE and TDA augmentation for divisions, separate brigades, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which is designed to fulfill the base camp and administrative requirements.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67
(RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WAY6TO) (U)

This augmentation package will be presented to USARPAC and DA during the week of 22 January 1968 and, if approved, will provide additional personnel and equipment for base camp and administrative problem areas.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



D. E. TUMAN
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

cy furn:
HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
HQ, II FFORCEV

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GPOP-DT (20 Nov 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 from HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (UIC: WAY6AA) (RCS
CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 24 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. F. Osbourn
K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
37th Medical Company
506th Supply and Service Company (Spt)
551st Light Maintenance Company (Spt)
1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Bn
1st Platoon, 588th Signal Company
5th Weather Squadron Detachment (USAF)
7th Army Postal Unit
11th AA Platoon, 2nd Civil Affairs Company
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
46th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
398th Transportation Detachment
9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance)
409th Radio Research Unit
541st Military Intelligence Detachment
Detachment, Company C, 9th Signal Bn (Spt)
Tm, 246th PSYOPS Company

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company 1
Howitzer Battery

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ARMY AVIATION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. Sorties Flown:

	<u>Command and Control</u>	<u>Troop Lift</u>	<u>Cargo Lift</u>	<u>Casualty Evac</u>
OH-23G	2,131			
UH-1D	758	605	462	45

	<u>Aerial Fire Support and Reaction Forces</u>	<u>Administration</u>	<u>Reconnaissance</u>
OH-23G		1,107	57
UH-1C	2,859	160	12
UH-1D		1,983	77

	<u>Number of Passengers</u>	<u>Tons Cargo</u>	<u>Hours Flown</u>	<u>Fuel Consumed (in gallons)</u>
OH-23G	1,545		1,140	19,380
UH-1C			2,224	200,160
UH-1D	8,503	165	1,474	132,660

2. Results of Fire: August September October Total

Viet Cong Killed confirmed	4	2	1	7
Viet Cong Killed estimated	3	1	0	4
Viet Cong captured	0	0	2	2
Structures destroyed	4	6	3	13
Structures damaged	7	2	2	11
Ammunition Consumed		7.62mm	2.75in	40mm
Rounds		554,650	2,017	5,482

3. Aircraft Availability (expressed in percent of assigned aircraft):

	OH-23	UH-1C	UH-1D
August	61	78	79
September	58	77	78
October	64	79	78

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AIR FORCE STATISTICS

1. O-1 SORTIES:

	NO. MISSIONS
FAC	67
VR	234
Escort	266
Maintenance	3
Arty Adjust	10
Total Hours	1054+00 hours

2. TACTICAL AIR SORTIES:

F-100	114
F-4C	27
B-57	2
C-47	2
A-1	2
A-37	64

3. ORDNANCE EXPENDED:

MK-117	750 lb.	226
MK-81	250 lb.	57
MK-82	500 lb.	334
NAPALM	750 lb.	271
CBU		4
LAU Rockets		38
.50 caliber		3,200 rounds
7.62mm		2,000 rounds
20mm		44,420 rounds

4. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

Structures Destroyed	12
Sampans Destroyed	5
Sampans Damaged	2
Secondary Explosions	15
Bunkers Destroyed	18
Bunkers uncovered	3
Trench Destroyed	315 meters
Trench Uncovered	220 meters
Trail Destroyed	215 meters
Trail Uncovered	595 meters
Foxholes Destroyed	8

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PX STATISTICS

11 June - 10 July 1967	Blackhorse Exchange	\$173,291.70
	Concessions	\$ 5,506.55
	Total	\$178,798.25
11 July - 10 August	Blackhorse Exchange	\$224,207.99
	Concessions	\$ 6,367.25
	Total	\$230,575.24
11 August - 10 September	Blackhorse Exchange	\$232,883.67
	Concessions	\$ 8,119.20
	Total	\$241,002.87
11 September - 10 October	Blackhorse Exchange	\$239,027.90
	Concessions	\$ 11,533.50
	Annexes	\$ 24,676.41
	Total	\$275,237.81
11 October - 24 October	Blackhorse Exchange	\$ 96,796.06
	Concessions	\$ 2,954.96
	Annexes	\$ 13,258.15
	Total	\$113,009.17

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STANDARDS OF EVALUATION OF RP/PF OUTPOSTS

CATEGORIES	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D
a. Overhead Cover	Fighting and protective bunkers	Some	Burn Only	None
b. Towers	Yes	None	None	None
c. Automatic Weapons	All Authorized	Some	None	None
d. Barrier Wire	3 Belts/100m deep	2 belts/50m deep	1 belt/25m deep	None
e. AP Mines	Sufficient	Some	None	None
f. Warning Devices and Flares	Sufficient	Some	None	None
g. Indirect Fire Support	Preplanned Arty	Unplanned Arty available	Mortar spt only	None
h. Field of Fire	300m	200m	100m	50m or less
i. Communication	Radio W/District and Adj OP; planned visual commo	Radio W/Adj OP Planned Visual Commo	Some type with Adj outposts	None
j. Location	Excellent	Good	Fair	Relocate
k. Patrol/Lasting Post	Yes	Yes	None	None

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- | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|------|------|
| 1. Access by Wheeled Vehicle | Excellent by Road | Good by Road | Fair | Poor |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|------|------|


NOTES:

1. If a particular outpost is acceptable in all categories for a certain class except one, give it the higher classification with a remark indicating what is missing, i.e.: Class A (No Automatic Weapons).
2. For RF units indicate when only a platoon of a particular company mans an outpost. Name or identify platoon.
3. ESTIMATE OF LEADERSHIP/PREPAREDNESS:
 - a. Defense plan: YES/NO; Rehearsed: YES/NO; Day/Night Defense: YES/NO; Adequate: YES/NO
 - b. Clear lines of Authority and Responsibility: YES/NO
 - c. Overall rating: Satisfactory/Marginal/Unsatisfactory.
4. Outpost is in center of hamlet.
5. Defoliation is/is not needed (For unrecorded minefield).
6. Defense can/can not be improved.

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Viet Cong Order of Battle
and Secret Zones




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Operations
1 Aug - 31 Oct



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Security Classification

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Considerations